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3

Power

THE KEY to an understanding of the socialist system is to examine the *structure of power,* which receives little or no attention in many comparative studies of economic systems. In my opinion, the characteristics of the power structure are precisely the source from which the chief regularities of the system can be deduced.[1]

This chapter, on power, and chapter 4, on ideology, are closely related. The present chapter deals with the institutions of power and the way they work, and chapter 4 deals with the objectives, value system, and ideas behind the political actions of those who possess that power. One might say that this chapter is about the body of power, and chapter 4 is about its soul.

The description and analysis will be brief, because they concentrate on the characteristics essential from the point of view of the book's subject: the economy of the socialist system. There is no discussion of several other attributes of the political structure that to a historian or a political scientist would be of equal interest.

3.1 The Party

The established practice in the social sciences is to make a distinction between a particular organization or institution's formal rules of operation, in the sense of its declared, internal rulebook and the official prescriptions of the law of the state, and the actual regularities governing how it works. How similar and how different are these two "rules of the game"? This distinction will be made in the following description of how the party, the state, and the so-called mass organizations operate.

[1]Let me propose the following procedure for the reader to consider:

Before beginning chapter 3, it might be worth reading chapter 15, which sums up the whole of part 2, dealing with the classical system. Although some of the concepts in chapter 15 may not be clear until chapters 3–14 have been read, the summary more or less projects the main conclusions, which makes the chapters that follow here easier to understand.

My proposal would be that the reader continue with chapters 3–14 after that; when chapter 15 is reached again, it would be worth rereading it in the light of the information gathered from studying part 2.

Of course, the train of thought can be followed clearly also without the advance reading of chapter 15.

The fundamental institution in the power structure is the Communist party.[2] (For brevity's sake it will be referred to hereafter generally as "the party," without qualification.) The socialist countries have a *one-party system* in which no other party can operate.[3] At the peak of its power, the party comprised a substantial proportion of the population (see table 3.1).

The chief organizing principle in the party's rules of organization is "democratic centralism." Entry into the party is voluntary; the admission of an applicant is decided upon by the party branch.[4] The branches are the basic cells of party, covering all party members in a specific territorial unit (e.g., a city or part of a city) or place of work (e.g., a factory). The leading body is elected at a meeting of the branch members for a specified term. The branch is headed by the party secretary.

The branches are under the direction of higher party organizations, usually arranged on territorial principles. For instance, a district party committee headed by a district party secretary has over it a county party committee and a county party secretary. At the top of the pyramid is the Central Committee (or in federal countries consisting of several states, such as the Soviet Union, China, or Yugoslavia, the federal Central Committee). The national (or federal) Central Committee elects a smaller, executive body of control from its own ranks; the customary term for this is the Political Committee. (The well-known Soviet term is "Politbureau.") The Central Committee also elects the party leader (general secretary) and his immediate colleagues, the national (or federal) secretaries.

[2]For a long time the *Short History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,* the Stalinist version of party history, was holy writ in the Soviet Union, underscoring the central role of the party. It later fulfilled similar functions in the Eastern European socialist countries.

For scholarly works on the history and functioning of Communist parties, see the following books. *Soviet Union:* J. F. Hough and M. Fainsod [1953] (1979) and J. F. Hough (1969); *China:* H. Harding (1981) and J. W. Lewis, ed. (1970); *Eastern Europe:* S. Fischer-Galati, ed. (1979).

[3]In several socialist countries, such as China and Poland, other parties existed formally even under the classical system, but they had no actual power or even independent influence over political matters.

[4]The specific terms used ("branch," "party leadership," "party secretary," etc.) may differ from country to country. In such cases the terminology in this book is an attempt to use terms unrestricted to a particular socialist country and applicable to all of them. With a few exceptions, the book also refrains from listing the specific terms used in each country.

The same procedure will be followed in the rest of the book for other unstandardized terms that differ slightly from country to country while having the same meaning nonetheless.

TABLE 3.1
Proportion of Party Members in Socialist Countries, 1986

Country	*Party Members (thousand)*	*Party Members (percent of population)*
Albania	147	4.9
Bulgaria	932	10.4
China	44,000	4.2
Cuba	524	5.1
Czechoslovakia	1,675	10.8
East Germany	2,304	13.8
Hungary	871	8.2
Mongolia	88	4.5
North Korea	2,500	12.2
Poland	2,126	5.7
Romania	3,557	15.6
Soviet Union	18,500	6.6
Vietnam	1,700	2.7
Yugoslavia	2,168	9.3

Source: R. F. Staar (1987, pp. 45–47).
Note: The data on membership are based on the declarations of the parties themselves. The share of party members is given as the percentage of the total population. A comparison to the adult population would result in even higher proportions.

Under the formal rules, all leading bodies and all party secretaries at every level are elected by the party membership, either directly or indirectly through delegates or acts of election by party leaders who themselves have been elected already. This electoral procedure, along with the rule that party resolutions can be passed only by elected bodies, constitutes the democratic side of the principle of democratic centralism. The other side is centralism: the decision of a higher party body is binding on a lower party body, and ultimately on every member of the party. A party matter is open to debate until it has been decided, after which it must be implemented without argument or protest.

In real life, centralism prevails very strongly. According to its formal rules, the organization is built up from below, but in practice it works to a far greater extent from above.

The central leadership has available a large staff of officials who concurrently constitute a bureaucratic hierarchy of department heads, dep-

uty department heads, and employees. Under the formal rules, these appointed party officials have no power, since the right to decide belongs exclusively to the elected bodies. In fact, they exercise great influence on the management of affairs.

Formally, the general secretary is merely the one who executes the decisions of the central leadership, and between central leadership sessions those of the Political Committee. In practice, enormous power is concentrated in his hands. Here the prime example one thinks of is Stalin's role in the Soviet Union,[5] but the almost absolute power of the general secretary develops sooner or later, in an extreme or less extreme form, in every socialist country that arrives at the stage of classical socialism.

The post of secretary is a full-time job, at least in the larger branches. Alongside all middle-level party bodies and the larger, if not the smaller, branches, an organization of appointed party officials is established.

What ultimately emerges is a bureaucratic hierarchy that encompasses the whole of the party: instructions passed down from above must be carried out by the subordinates. Under such a system of superiority and subordination, the distinction between elected officers and appointed officials counts for little. Collectively, the elected (though full-time) party leaders and the appointed party officials are known in common parlance as the *party apparatus*.

Clearly, the nature of the selection process has been reversed. In practice, the elected body is not picking the members of the apparatus. Instead, the apparatus is choosing those who will join the elected body at the next election and whom they in turn will elect as secretary. Ultimately, the apparatus determines who gains admittance into the party, which party member becomes a member of the party apparatus (in other words, a party functionary), and which party functionary is promoted to a higher function. In a similar way, exclusion from the party or from elected party bodies is also in the hands of the apparatus. Formally, every detail of admission, promotion, entry into party bodies, demotion to a lower function, or exclusion is validated by electoral procedures or the decisions of elected bodies, but all this is largely an empty formality. The case has been decided before the election is held or the decision made.

3.2 The State

In its formal constitution, laws, and legal regulations, the state under the classical socialist system resembles any other modern state. It is divided into three separate branches: a legislature, a state administration responsible for applying the laws, and a judiciary. The members of the legislature (which will be referred to hereafter as parliament) are elected by the general public. Parliament then nominates the government. Local legislatures (hereafter local councils) operate in each territorial unit (in federal countries in each state, and within states in each county, city, township, etc.). These local councils are independent within limits laid down by the law and have their own executive organizations.

In a number of socialist countries the constitution asserts that the leading force in the country is the Communist party, but the way this leading role applies in practice is not specified. As a first approach one might say that the activities of party and state are closely interwoven in a way that ensures that the party is the dominant force in their common activity.[6] Although the laws of the state do not define it, the party's jurisdiction in practice covers the following:

1. All major appointments, promotions, and dismissals are decided upon by the various bodies of the party. The regulations of the state are silent on the subject, but the rules of the party normally lay down precisely which party body's resolution is required before a specific post is filled, in other words, which personnel decisions are the prerogative of the Political Committee and which of the party leadership at the county, city, or branch level.[7] This prerogative of selection covers offices in the state administration and all major managerial positions in the economy. Party committees decide who will be president of the republic and who will stand for parliamentary and local government elections. Since in most of the cases there is only one candidate for each seat, the practical result is that the representatives are selected by the party. Similarly, party organizations decide on the appointment of judges and prosecutors.

The importance of the party apparatus's role in selecting the members of elected party organizations was pointed out in the previous section. It should be added here that the party apparatus also prepares the party committees' resolutions on other personnel matters, so that they are little more than confirmation of choices put forward by the party apparatus beforehand. One can conclude, therefore, that the party apparatus plays the key role in selecting the members of the legislature, the state administration, and the judiciary.

2. The party organizations reach decisions on every major affair of state before the state organization responsible has come to its own deci-

[5]There is a rich biographical literature on Stalin. See, for instance, I. Deutscher (1966), R. Tucker (1973, 1990), and A. Ulam (1973). Tucker in particular shows the interactions between the nature of the Bolshevik movement and the charismatic-terroristic leadership Stalin provided.

[6]In the 1950s I heard József Révai, the top ideologist in the Hungarian party, make the apt "dialectical" observation: "The party and the state are not one, but they are not two either."

[7]In Soviet professional jargon, this body of regulations is known as the *nomenklatura*. The term nomenklatura is also used in a figurative sense to denote the leading stratum.

sion. The major decisions of the government are preceded by resolutions of the party's central leadership or Political Committee, those of county councils by resolutions of county party committees, and so on.

3. The party apparatus is in direct touch with the apparatus of state. The effect is a curious kind of duplication in which a specific party functionary or group of functionaries within the party apparatus has responsibility for every important sphere of state activity. The central party apparatus contains departments responsible for industry, agriculture, education, culture, foreign affairs, military matters, and so on. The duplication, however, is not total.[8] One discrepancy is in scale: there are normally far fewer people in the party apparatus dealing with a particular area than there are in the parallel state organization. On the other hand, the small staff has great power. Its word is decisive, even though it may not formally issue instructions at all.

Additionally, and very importantly, the task of the party apparatus includes supervision of the state apparatus. It must report immediately on any irregularity it finds.

Under constitutional law there is no obligation on the state officials, members of parliament, and councils or judges to obey the instructions of the party. The majority of them are party members, however, and as such they are obliged to carry out the party's instructions. In practice, their obligation extends beyond the resolutions of elected party bodies to the individual behests of the appropriate party functionary, the blanket justification being that his or her instructions are designed to implement the party's resolutions.

Speaking of an interweaving of party and state, I have mentioned so far only the way the party (or rather its apparatus) holds sway over the state. Use of the term "interweaving" can be justified by the following circumstances:

Some members of the elected party bodies hold state office or leading positions in the state-owned sector, as ministers, deputy ministers, chief executives of state-owned firms, ambassadors, generals, police chiefs, and members of parliament. So to that extent the "state" has penetrated the party, not just the party the "state."

Interweaving also takes place in the careers of individuals. Someone who starts life as a lowly party functionary, of course, may advance exclusively within the party apparatus. The same applies to the apparatus of the state: an individual may enter it and remain in it throughout his or her career. But to switch from one to the other is far from exceptional:

[8]The party bodies at lower levels are organized on regional principles, but each regional party apparatus likewise contains bodies that correspond to a number of functional institutions of state (state administration of industry, agriculture, etc.).

a factory manager may be promoted to city party secretary and then return to the state administration as a deputy minister. Conversely, he or she may begin as a party secretary, continue as a chief executive of a large company or a chief of police, and later fill a high office in the party. For this reason it is customary in socialist countries to talk of "members of the apparatus," "functionaries," or "cadres" in a comprehensive sense, without necessarily stipulating where the function is performed (whether in the party or in the state). These are also the grounds on which some authors employ the term *party-state*.

A line of argument constantly put forward in debate is that despite the undoubted overlap between the party and the state, there is nonetheless a "natural division of labor" between them: the party performs political functions and the state administrative ones. But this distinction does not apply under this system. Politics influences all dimensions of life; there are no administrative affairs "free of politics." The Communist party considers itself responsible for everything and does not allow the organizations of state and those working in the state apparatus any autonomy at all. In fact, the existence of the "party-state" and the blending of the political and administrative functions is one of the main characteristics of the system.

3.3 The Mass Organizations

The various organizations and associations in society are termed collectively *mass organizations*.[9] With only a few exceptions, their main chareristic is for each to have an organizational monopoly in its own field. There is one labor-union movement, one youth league, and one women's organization. The Academy of Sciences alone has the right to represent science. It is worth mentioning particularly the various professional bodies: there is a single association of engineers, writers' union, musicians' union, motion picture union, and so forth.

This organizational monopoly makes it possible for the mass organizations to function concurrently as authorities. The labor unions of many socialist countries handle welfare funds provided out of the state budget and limit the benefits from them to their members. Membership in the appropriate arts organization doubles as a permit to engage in that artistic activity professionally; without that membership it cannot be pursued.

[9]Of the literature on mass organizations, the reader is referred to B. Ruble and A. Pravda, eds. (1986) and A. Kahan and B. Ruble, eds. (1979). Both books describe the role of the trade unions.

Legally and formally, each mass organization is autonomous and its officers are elected by its members, directly or indirectly, according to its statutes. In practice, the party decides who the candidates for election will be.[10] When all is said and done, a leading officer in a mass organization is as much a functionary as any member of the apparatus or any high state official. At this point one can extend all that was said in the previous section about state officials to cover officers in the mass organizations. They too are under the direction of the party, since the main resolutions they pass are preceded by decisions of the relevant party body. Members of the party apparatus actively intervene in the mass organizations' affairs; in practice, if not formally, they order them to take specific measures. The mass organizations' main function ultimately becomes one of conveying the ideas and intentions of the party to "target" sectors of society (the workers, youth, women) corresponding to the sphere of each organization. As Lenin put it, they are "transmission belts" between the party and the masses.

Also applicable to the mass organizations are the earlier remarks about interweaving. The leaders of the larger organizations (the unions, the youth league) are commonly members of the leading party bodies at various levels (national, regional, and branch). They represent their movements in the party leadership and the party in their movements. If they fail to do the latter, the party appoints others to their posts.

The observations on the careers of functionaries can be extended to the mass organizations in the same way. It is quite frequent for an officer in the labor or youth movement, say, to become a higher functionary in the party or state, or for a party or state functionary to move to a higher post in a mass organization.

3.4 Cohesive Forces

To refer to the organization consisting of functionaries of the party, the state, the mass organizations, and also the managers of the state-owned sector collectively, two terms will be used as synonyms in the remainder this book: *apparatus* and *bureaucracy*.[11] Where no specific reference

[10]In 1929 the Communist party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik) dismissed Tomsky from his leading position in the labor unions. (Later he committed suicide.) Kaganovich, one of Stalin's closest associates, made this comment on the dismissal: "The greater part of the leadership . . . has been replaced. It could be said that this was a violation of proletarian democracy, but, Comrades, it has long been known that for us Bolsheviks democracy is no fetish." *Report on the Sixteenth Congress,* quoted by R. Conquest [1968] (1973, p. 41).

[11]"Bureaucracy" is used colloquially and in sociology in several different senses. Colloquially it has a pejorative ring, implying such things as roundabout handling of matters, unenthusiastic work, and delay in reaching decisions. By social scientists, particularly since Max Weber [1925] (1978, chaps. 3, 11), it has been used as a value-free technical term to denote a specific social formation irrespective of whether it operates in a good, speedy, and compassionate or a bad, tardy, and inhuman way. This book uses the term in the latter, value-free sense. (However, the bureaucracy under the socialist system differs in many features from the one with which Max Weber was concerned [→6.1].)

is made to a particular bureaucracy (the apparatus of the party or the state or a specific mass organization such as the labor-union movement), the terms apply to all the apparatuses collectively. So the party apparatus, in the terminology of this book, is part of the bureaucracy—not something external to it but an integral element of it—indeed, the most powerful part of it, dominating the other elements.

What forces bind the bureaucracy together?

1. *Ideology.* The bureaucracy, and particularly its leading force, the party, is held together by specific ideas, aims, and values. Many members of the apparatus are people guided by noble purposes who work long, hard hours in the firm belief that in doing so they serve the cause of their party and of the people, the common good and the interests of mankind. At this point I merely make reference to the cohesive force of a common ideology before turning to other forces. As mentioned before, the influence of ideology is so important that the whole of the next chapter will be devoted to it.

2. *Power.* The members of the bureaucracy, which includes the party, are bound together by their resolve to retain power. The bureaucracy constitutes the power elite of the classical system.[12] The power, of course, is shared unequally because of the multilevel, hierarchical way in which the bureaucracy is structured. The party apparatus plays a prominent part; it is "stronger" than the other provinces of the bureaucracy. Higher-level functionaries have greater power than lower-level ones. It must also be noted that everyone in the bureaucracy (apart from the paramount leader at the very top) is at once a master and a servant: one can order about those below one, but one must obey those above. Ultimately, however, this group in society rules collectively over the other citizens, deciding their destinies and disposing of the country's resources. As the possessor of power, the bureaucracy reproduces itself indefinitely, even though the people who make it up are constantly changing.[13]

[12]On the concept of "elite," see the R. Michels [1911] (1962) and V. Pareto [1916] (1935).

[13]Some authors classify the bureaucracy of a classical socialist system as a ruling class. This idea arose first in the writings of L. Trotsky [1937] (1970) and M. Djilas (1957). Similar notions have been advanced by J. Kuron and K. Modzielewski (1968).

G. Konrád and I. Szelényi (1979) put their emphasis on the potential class-power of the intellectuals. In a self-critical follow-up, Szelényi (1986) revised some ideas of the earlier book concerning the willingness of the bureaucracy to share power and the chances of the rise of an entrepreneurial class. He discussed the latter point in more detail in Szelényi (1988).

Continued

3. *Prestige and privileges*. The members of the bureaucracy have prestige. This applies first and foremost within the bureaucracy, where a member in a higher position has prestige in the eyes of a member in a lower position. Under the system (save among a few exceptional professions such as scholars, scientists, artists, and sports figures, who have their own yardsticks of prestige), the level of the position attained in the bureaucracy is the sole measure of rank.[14] (This contrasts with the situation in societies based on a pluralist power structure and private ownership, where parallel measures of prestige exist, of which one of the most important consists of business success, income, and wealth.)

The ultimate instance of prestige attaching to high office is the phenomenon referred to in the socialist countries as the "the cult of personality." The highest leader of the country is literally revered as a person superhumanly talented, infallible, and omniscient. The prime examples to have emerged under the classical socialist system are Stalin and Mao Zedong, in the two largest socialist countries, the Soviet Union and China. Similar cults grew up around the party leaders in all the other countries during the Stalin period, and even after Stalin's death many features of the personality cult could be observed in countries where the classical system lived on.[15]

Similar symptoms, on a lesser scale than in the cult of personality surrounding the leader of a country, appear in the case of a regional or branch party secretary, who possesses a special aura, and whose every word is regarded as wise and unerringly true.

The prestige is accompanied by material privileges proportionate to rank [→13.5]. Actual pay is not particularly high, although the relative salary proportions between higher and lower positions are no less than those customary in the state bureaucracy of a capitalist country. By contrast, all the more importance attaches to the fringe material benefits in

The position in this debate depends, of course, on one's definition of the term "class." On alternative definitions of class and class conflict, and modern usage of this sphere of concepts, see R. Dahrendorf (1959).

In any case, definitional difficulties arise when one comes to analyze the power elite of a socialist society. For instance, I have just mentioned the enormous inequality apparent in the distribution of power. So this book will avoid using the expression "ruling class" for the bureaucracy in power under the classical socialist system.

[14]There exist not merely informal definitions of "equivalence" but ones for formal, protocol purposes, laying down, for instance, which state positions (minister, deputy minister, ministry department head, etc.) bestow the same rank as the various grades of party functionary, army officer, company executive, officer in a mass organization, and so on.

[15]For example, the cults of Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania, Fidel Castro in Cuba, and Kim Il Sung in North Korea.

addition to pay. They include benefits in kind, either free or at a very cheap price. Functionaries also have access to goods and services in short supply. The functionary can shop in special closed stores offering goods not available in ordinary stores; he or she has an institutionally owned apartment.[16] Functionaries receive medical treatment in hospitals that are better equipped and less crowded; they spend vacations in closed places better supplied than the usual company holiday center; and so on. These special services may even be provided in several grades: a higher-ranking functionary may be treated in an even better hospital, shop in an even better stocked store, use a chauffeur-driven, institutionally owned car, have a personal vacation home, and so on. Many of these material privileges are also available to the functionary's family.

Let there be no misunderstanding: in spite of these material privileges, a functionary's standard of living falls short of the level of the wealthy in a capitalist society. Nevertheless, the privileges are great enough for the withdrawal of them to come as a blow.

4. *Coercion*. I have mentioned that every party member is under an obligation to put party resolutions and instructions into practice. Clearly, it is also compulsory in the state bureaucracy to carry out measures decided on higher up. The final result is a party and state discipline whose observance is enforced.

There is a system of retributions within the party: various grades of censure, transfer to a lower function, and, as the ultimate punishment, expulsion from the party. Under the classical system, the last is a very serious penalty, since it brings a functionary's career in the apparatus to an abrupt end and is followed in many cases by prosecution by the state.

Infringement of state discipline can have the legal consequences customary under other systems as well, ranging from withdrawal of cash bonuses to demotion or dismissal. But the penalty can be much graver than this: a sentence in a labor camp or prison, or execution.

So far I have been referring to penalties for real infringements of party and state discipline, but the concept of discipline expands under the classical system. It is a functionary's duty not merely to obey precisely phrased instructions with blind obedience, but to follow faithfully a currently valid political line. Departure from this line (or in extreme cases a real or assumed intention to depart from it or grounded or groundless suspicions of such an intention) is enough to incur the discipline of the party or prosecution by the state. That leads to the next question: the conflicts *within* the bureaucracy.

[16]There is no complete translation of the term used in socialist countries (*sluzhebnaia kvartira* in Russian or *szolgálati lakás* in Hungarian). The apartment or the car is owned or rented by the employer (for example, by the company or government office) and allotted to the employee as a part of the package of fringe benefits.

3.5 Internal Conflicts

The bureaucracy and the party as the motive force behind it do not constitute a monolithic entity, since a variety of internal conflicts appear in them. During the periods of greatest repression, these conflicts are almost entirely submerged, but they reappear in various forms as soon as there is a slight relaxation.

The sharpest form of internal conflict is the operation of "wings" or factions within the party. In fact, they can amount to the germs of parties within the party, although they normally take a very loosely organized form. A faction is the concerted appearance of a group that represents a line of its own, differing decisively from the line other groups are taking, on issues of political import. For instance, a group with a separate political platform of this kind was formed in the Soviet party by the party leaders who opposed the plan for the forcible, swift collectivization of agriculture.

The operation of factions and separate political groupings is forbidden by the internal statutes of a Communist party. What usually happens sooner or later is that the political group in power at a particular time eliminates the groups that attack its political line.[17] For these reasons it can prove quite dangerous to start forming a political group within the party. Of course, when new and fundamental problems have to be decided upon, new factions, or at least new looser political groupings, often emerge all over again. But never, under the classical system, can any faction really strengthen itself to a point where it becomes a stable oppositional organization capable of surviving in the longer term.

Conflicts within the party can emerge also in a great many other dimensions, for instance, over the division of political influence among various ethnic groups or in the struggle for power between generations. The latter heightens particularly when the question of succession to paramount leadership arises.

Another type of conflict occurs when the functionaries of the state and the mass organizations chafe at the interference of the party apparatus, who for their part are discontented with the level of enthusiasm shown by the former in carrying out the party's instructions.

[17]Stalin used merciless terror to settle scores successively with all the political opposition groups. On this, see the classic work by R. Conquest [1968] (1973), and also the biography of Bukharin by S. F. Cohen [1973] (1980). In Eastern Europe, the real or assumed representatives of "national communism" were eliminated in a similar fashion. Another well-known example of a grouping opposed to the political line of the moment being eliminated was the trial in China, after Mao's death, of the "Gang of Four," Mao's immediate associates.

The classical socialist system is not immune to the social phenomenon known to Americans as the pressure group or lobby.[18] Representatives of the interests of the various branches or industrial sectors, professions, trades, and geographical regions attempt to pressure the central organizations (for instance, over resource allocation or appointments). Some groups of this kind extend right across the various sectors of the party, state, and mass-organization bureaucracy and have "their men" representing them in the widest variety of positions. The farming lobby, for instance, includes central leadership members of peasant origin, the leading party and state officials from agricultural counties, heads of the Ministry of Agriculture, members of parliament for farming constituencies, and professors of agricultural universities. There is a "mining lobby," a "cultural lobby," and so on. Each group strives to promote its ideas through its personal connections and by various means of exercising political pressure (sending delegations, speaking up at meetings, arranging for articles to be written for the newspapers, etc.).

Earlier in this chapter the cohesive forces binding together the various parts of the bureaucracy were underscored, but a full picture should also include the conflicts among them.

3.6 Repression and the Totalitarian Nature of Power

After describing the nature of the apparatus in the previous sections, it is time to make a few observations on the relations between the ruling elite and the rest of society.

The bureaucracy sets out to convince people to support their policy, using the whole arsenal of education and modern political propaganda for the purpose [→4]. Rallies and mass marches are political features of the classical system. But to augment the arsenal and give special emphasis to the words of enlightenment there is repression. Not only active political opposition and organization, but even half-stifled grumbling can have cruel consequences. In the most extreme periods of the classical system it becomes common for confessions to be extracted under torture, and for masses of people to be imprisoned, sent to labor camps, or executed.[19] The oppression extends beyond those who take up the struggle

[18]This idea was first worked out in application to the Soviet Union by H. G. Skilling (1966) and F. Griffiths and H. G. Skilling, eds. (1971). The wide-ranging debate around these issues can be followed through J. F. Hough (1972), W. Odom (1976), and S. Solomon, ed. (1983). A discussion for the case of Chinese politics is K. Lieberthal and M. Oksenberg (1988).

[19]The most important document to summarize this is A. I. Solzhenitsyn's famous book *The Gulag Archipelago* (1974–78).

in the political arena [→3.4] to many other groups in society on various grounds: well-to-do peasants, some religious denominations, certain groups in the urban intelligentsia, workers who demand higher pay, and so on. By the time the political structure of the classical system has been consolidated, the spirit of the vast majority of people has been broken to such an extent that they dare not even think of resistance. This mass repression is the basis on which enforcement of the regulations and instructions of the leadership rests. This is what ensures discipline in society.

In a number of senses the structure of power under the classical socialist system is totalitarian in nature.[20]

The influence of the bureaucracy extends to every sphere of life. Under any social system there are matters in which the state plays a part of some kind: it erects legal barriers, interferes by issuing state regulations, acts as a buyer or as the proprietor of a state-owned firm, and so on. Under other systems there also are "private" spheres in which the state cannot or will not intervene. This distinction between the state and "civil society," state affairs and private affairs, becomes entirely blurred under the classical socialist system. Of course, the bureaucracy is not capable of making decisions and rules on everything, but the limitation on what it does is solely practical. It is not prepared in principle to declare any matter outside its jurisdiction or say it does not wish to intervene in it [→6.7, 19.5, 19.6].

So the influence of the bureaucracy spreads to such traditionally private spheres as culture, religion, the life of the family, how many children people have, the relations of a household with its neighbors, how free-time is spent, the choice of career and employment, and much more. Nor have I even mentioned that every economic transaction qualifies as a matter of concern to the party and the state.[21]

[20]The classic references on totalitarianism are H. Arendt (1951), focusing on the psychology of totalitarianism, and Z. Brzezinski and C. Friedrich (1956), focusing on the analysis of general characteristics of the phenomenon.

[21]Some studies have likened the classical socialist system to "military dictatorship." The analogy is false for several reasons. For one thing, power in a military dictatorship is concentrated into the hands of the generals and the military staff. By contrast, the driving force behind the bureaucratic machinery under the classical socialist system is not the top military but the party, even though the army and the police organizations play, of course, an important part. In fact, in a totalitarian society, the military force is always under the control of the party. As Mao said, "Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party." Mao Zedong [1938] (1967, p. 272).

For another, although military dictatorships (for instance, in Latin America, Africa, and Asia) impose brutal terror on the population, they are not "totalitarian" in character. There are numerous spheres of life that the leading groups of a typical military dictatorship make no effort to influence at all.

The power of the bureaucracy is also totalitarian in that it permeates the whole of society and influences every citizen. Account is kept of every resident and employee by the party branches, mass organizations, state apparatus, and police authorities of each locality and place of work. To take an example, every adult carries an identification document in which is stamped one's place of work, place of residence, and family status. A change in any of these is registered in one's ID, which one is obliged to present at the behest of any authority. To take another example, whatever function a citizen may perform, whether it is the lowliest post in the party, a mass organization, the state, or the economy, the item of information will be recorded by the personnel department concerned. From then on this file of information accompanies one for the rest of one's life. Wherever one goes to work there is, ultimately, a single and indivisible bureaucracy that passes one's file and all its information from hand to hand.

Finally, there is a third point of view from which power is totalitarian. The bureaucracy is not subordinate to any stable legal system. There is a constitution, but its wording is sufficiently general to leave the legislators a free hand. Formally the laws are passed by parliament, but in practice the party organization concerned, and so in effect the party apparatus, decides what the law should stipulate. Moreover, there are a vast number of state regulations that do not receive the rank of law even formally: they remain as government or ministerial orders, or, most common of all, simply the personal rulings of a particular member of the bureaucracy. For the bureaucracy itself decides the kind of legal shape it wishes to give to its various rulings.

Not infrequently the bureaucracy, particularly certain groups and branches within it, actually infringes on the laws that exist on paper. This creates an especially grave situation when the breach of legality is to the serious detriment of millions of individuals, when there is mass resettlement, exile, imprisonment, torture, and execution. But one should add that if those in power so wish, the "legal foundation" for mass repression can be laid at any time. Laws, government orders, and court sentences can be passed to give formal, legal sanction to the persecution of groups or individuals. This precisely supports the assertion made earlier that the bureaucracy is not subordinate to the legal system. The line of effect is in precisely the opposite direction: the formal system of law is subordinate to the current endeavors of the bureaucracy.

There are well-known theoretical models of bureaucracy that describe the relationship between the electorate, the legislature, and the bureaucratic organization ("bureau") and then try to deduce from it the behavioral regularities of the bureaucracy.[22] According to such a model, the

[22]See W. Niskanen (1971).

legislators, with an eye to the next election, have an interest in winning the confidence of the voters. Aware of that interest, they issue instructions to the bureaucracy accordingly, and monitor how the bureaucracy performs. In the realm of these models, the bureaucracy is subordinate to the legislature.

Such models do not apply to the classical socialist system because two of the models' main premises do not hold. (1) The legislature, in direct contradiction to the assumptions of the models, is not dependent on the voters; instead, its members are nominated by the bureaucracy itself, so that the legislature becomes a component of the bureaucratic apparatus. (2) For the same reason the legislature is not separate from the bureaucracy and does not regulate or control it; it is a part of it, and what is more, a subordinate part into the bargain.

As a consequence, the checks and balances that prevent the bureaucracy in a parliamentary democracy from acquiring and monopolizing power for itself permanently, or placing itself above the competing political forces, fail to operate. There are no independent courts that might check that the laws, ordinances, or activities of the state administration do not conflict with the constitution or earlier laws, that citizens might turn to for redress against the state, and that might protect the individual against the powers that be.

It was stated in the previous section that the power in the classical system is not monolithic, and that internal groupings and conflicts exist within it. Nonetheless, in the narrower sense now intended and according to the three criteria put forward here, the power structure under the classical socialist system is, after all, indivisible and totalitarian.[23]

[23]Western political scientists studying socialist systems have taken issue in their writings with the extreme interpretation of the theory of totalitarianism, and they have opposed to it the idea that there are groups in conflict with each other at work within the political structure. This book treats these as mutually compatible, complementary theories. It is true that the classical system is not "100 percent" totalitarian. Totalitarianism is a theoretical model that ignores some important phenomena, but it remains a sufficiently realistic approach to reality. So much so, in fact, that just as it was going out of style among Western academics, Eastern European dissident writers recognized its significance and began referring to it.

4

Ideology

IT IS not the intention of either this chapter or any other part of the book to provide a methodical analysis of intellectual history. Its purpose is a narrower one: to present those aspects of the ideology and of its ideas, beliefs, promises, values, and moral imperatives that actually contribute to the formation, stabilization, and maintenance of the classical socialist system.

4.1 The Official Ideology

I am concerned here with the official ideology as codified in the party's resolutions, party leaders' speeches and writings, textbooks on ideological subjects, leading articles in the press, and other official pronouncements.

Under full-fledged, stabilized classical socialism there is no open competition between alternative ideologies for the hearts and minds of the population. The bureaucracy enjoys an almost full ideological monopoly. There are tolerated alternative ideologies. For instance, it is not illegal to disseminate religious ideas, although churches run up in practice against a variety of administrative and economic obstacles, and they are subjected in certain countries and periods to merciless persecution. Ideologies diametrically opposed to the official one appear as well, but only temporarily, and by and large only semilegally or wholly illegally. Meanwhile, the official ideology is put forward by a vast apparatus of party, state, and mass organizations, served by the press, the other media, and educational, scientific, and cultural activity.

The official ideology is drawn from several sources and rooted deeply in the history of socialist ideas. It is laid down and solidifies in the way geological strata are formed.

The deepest stratum of all is the thinking of the early socialists and, later on, of Marx in particular. Also connected to these is the intellectual tradition of the European labor movement before the socialist revolutions.

The next stratum consists of the ideas, aspirations, and values of the revolutionary movements in the countries that later turned socialist [→1.2, 2.3].

Then comes the sphere of ideas that arose at the revolutionary-transitional stage out of the experiences of the Communist party once it had made the transition from a revolutionary party in opposition to a governing party with full responsibility, along with the pledges it made in that period to the people.

All these strata are overlaid with ideological elements that emerge as the classical socialist system is constructed. These tie in very closely with the system's development and stabilization-cum-rigidification, since they assist in these processes and justify what arises in practice.

In the Soviet Union's case this final stratum of official ideology is associated personally with Stalin, and termed Stalinism by many. Its influence is felt strongly beyond the Soviet borders in the official ideology of every socialist country.

A contribution to the shaping of this ideology is made by the leaders of the national parties themselves,[1] so that the official ideology of classical socialism varies from country to country. Other changes of various kinds take place with the passage of time.

The various strata are not irrespective of one another. The official ideology develops by selecting from the ideas in the earlier strata, some being forgotten and relegated to the system's "unconscious," and others gaining new emphases and contexts.

What this chapter ultimately attempts to do is to generalize from the several variants and identify in the official ideology of every country in which a classical socialist system is operative the traits that are common, characteristic, and permanent to the greatest degree.[2]

The forthcoming sections do not take issue with the official ideology, because it is merely its subject for description and analysis. The only fair demand to make of this description here is that it should portray its subject faithfully, without distortion. I shall refrain from pointing out repeatedly that what I am advancing is not my own point of view but an interpretation of the official ideology. Although there will be no debate on the official ideology of the classical system, it will be compared in later chapters with reality under that system.

4.2 The Socialist System's Sense of Superiority

The adherents of the official ideology are imbued with the Messianic belief that socialism is destined to save mankind. The conviction that the

[1]The part played by Mao Zedong should be specially noted, because he, after Stalin, was the leader who exerted the greatest influence outside his own country.

[2]Certain components of the official ideology will be discussed later in the book [→5.7, 7.1, 19.3, 21.1].

socialist system is superior to the capitalist is one of the most important ingredients in the ideology. The main assumption behind this is that socialist production relations offer more favorable conditions for developing the forces of production than capitalist production relations. Several factors point toward this:

Socialism can eliminate several attributes of capitalism that erode efficiency. Gross errors in the allocation of resources are caused by the anarchy of the market and the fluctuations in supply and demand. These problems can be overcome by planning, which does away with mass unemployment and the concomitant squandering of the most important production force of all, the human being. Planning allows one to avoid crises of overproduction and the incalculable losses they involve.[3] Competition based on private property leads to business secrecy, whereas under socialism innovations become common property. Competition leads to waste of other kinds, such as the proliferation of costly advertising and the eternal changing of models and types of product, which socialism can eliminate. Finally, it puts an end to the frittering away of resources on parasitical consumption by the exploiting classes.

Socialism has an additional advantage besides preventing the waste caused by private property, competition, and the market. Workers freed from exploitation work more enthusiastically and conscientiously than exploited proletarians. This enthusiasm increases performance and reduces the costs of supervision. Responsibility and enthusiasm for work will continue to grow until communism, the highest degree of social development, is reached, when they become a need in everyone's life, and it is possible to dispense entirely with the social costs of providing incentives to work, and thereby with those of selling goods for money and maintaining the remnants of the market.

Socialism's sense of superiority ties in with a conviction that capitalism has passed the stage at which it contributes to the progress of society and already exhibits many signs of decay.[4]

Marx and later Lenin emphasized that socialism's superiority is manifested in economic achievement and not (or not primarily) on an ethical

[3]The moment in history that most favored this sense of superiority was when the West was suffering from the grave effects of the 1929 Great Depression, when production fell back, and millions were thrown out of work, while in the Soviet Union the First Five-Year Plan was being briskly fulfilled.

[4]Albania's long-time socialist leader, Enver Hoxha, expressed it this way: "The so-called consumer society, so loudly advertised and praised to the skies by the bourgeoisie as the 'society of the future,' is nothing but a rotten, declining society, which is revealing more and more of the old permanent ulcers of capitalism which it tries to cover up. Such things will never occur with us." E. Hoxha (1975, p. 9).

plane.[5] The official ideology of classical socialism reflects a belief that this economic superiority follows from the system itself. Socialism achieves great accomplishments not because the population makes great sacrifices when required, nor because economic policy is better advised than in the capitalist countries, but because of the system's basic properties, which guarantee that sooner or later, once the initial disadvantage has been overcome, its superiority will plainly emerge.[6]

Among the main indicators of the end of the classical system is that this unqualified faith in the system's economic superiority is shaken; even socialism's advocates begin to doubt whether socialism necessarily or automatically favors economic performance more than capitalism and concede that capitalism has scored several good points in the contest between them. Once the idea that certain features of capitalism need somehow imitating or incorporating into socialism begins to pervade officialdom, the system is departing from its classical state.

Another important ingredient in socialism's sense of superiority is moral ascendancy, even though it does not count as a prime criterion in the competition between the systems. The official ideology states that socialism is a purer, nobler system that ensures social justice and equality. People themselves are transformed under this system, as they place themselves, voluntarily and increasingly, in the service of the common good, so conquering their own selfishness and individualism. This idea appears in Stalinist ideology, but it plays a particularly crucial role in Maoism. And this brings us back to the previous discussion: the profound change in human nature is an important factor for ensuring the economic superiority of socialism.

This book will return repeatedly to the problem of *values* [→1.7]. To use a philosophical term, the book will enumerate the social phenomena seen by one group or another in society to be of *intrinsic value,* and distinguish between those seen as *primary goods* and those seen merely as means or instruments for attaining some other intrinsic value or primary good. Official ideology suggests that the creation and maintenance of the socialist system is in itself a thing of value, a primary good. Even if it fails at a specific point to yield the performance of which its innate properties render it capable, it will yield it sooner or later. After all, any single factor of performance (e.g., material welfare, efficiency, or fair distribution) is only instrumental in nature and exists to further the real

[5]See, for example, Lenin's dictum: "Socialism calls for greater productivity of labor—compared with capitalism and on the basis achieved by capitalism." V. I. Lenin [1918] (1969b, p. 248).

[6]As Georg Lukács, the famous Hungarian Marxist philosopher, put it: "I have always thought that the worst form of socialism was better to live in than the best form of capitalism." G. Lukács (1971, p. 58).

purpose of creating and defending the socialist order. These factors will certainly appear as a by-product of the socialist system, even if there is a delay before they do so. Of greatest importance is the simple fact that socialism has been won.

4.3 The Basic Promises

One important ingredient in the official ideology consists of the basic promises made to the population by the party when it comes to power. What are the main achievements to be reckoned on, if not in the immediate future, at least later, after a decade or two?

Typically, the classical system emerges in a country that has been poor and backward before the revolution. In most cases the turbulence of the transitional period, coupled with warfare at home and abroad, has widened the gulf between the socialist country concerned and the industrial countries in the forefront of economic growth. The promise runs like this: soon the gap will be closed and the socialist country will catch up with the most highly developed capitalist countries. The potential for doing so lies in the superiority of the system, spoken of in the previous section. But it is only a potential that must be exploited. This can be done by concentrating resources on stimulating growth and making sacrifices on behalf of a high rate of growth [→9].

This promise to catch up with the capitalist economy is heard repeatedly.[7] Although the message takes different forms in different countries, according to their nature,[8] the germ of it remains the same: capitalism's level of economic development will be attained and surpassed within a historically foreseeable period. Several important features of the classical system's official ideology are exhibited here: self-confidence, a firm belief in the system's advantages; hope that the present problems are just temporary and a better life is within reach; and reassurance, mobilization for work and sacrifices in favor of a promising future.

Another group of promises concerns the citizens' way of life and the obligations the system undertakes. The socialist system, having inherited

[7]In East Germany, the slogan for a long time was "Überholen, ohne Einzuholen" (to overtake, without catching up), meaning that socialism was going to beat capitalism without reproducing any of its flaws.

[8]The idea was first framed by Stalin [→9.1] and then restored to the agenda by Khrushchev, who had this to say on the tasks of the Seven-Year Plan for 1960–67: By 1967 "or perhaps sooner the Soviet Union will emerge first in the world in both physical volume of production and *per capita* output. This will be a world historic victory for socialism in the peaceful competition with capitalism in the international arena." N. S. Khrushchev (1960, p. 56).

poverty and backwardness to start with, is still waging its initial struggle with external and internal enemies, and there is still misery and chaos, when the authorities take on a role similar to the one attempted by welfare states at a high level of economic development. Let every person do his or her task properly and the state will see to everything else. These ingredients of the ideology spring partly from the intellectual traditions of the labor movement and the European socialist parties, and partly from the platforms of revolutionary movements working under extremely unequal systems, whose unjust distribution of wealth they swore to eliminate should they come to power.

The first and perhaps most important factor to provide is jobs. There is to be full employment, if not at once, then in the foreseeable future. Everyone able to work has a constitutional right to work.

Several other provisions are due as civil rights as well. It is the state's obligation to provide the population with such basic needs as food, shelter, health care, education, vacations, and cultural goods and services. Typical first signs of a serious intention to fulfill the promise are the following. Basic foodstuffs are sold at very low prices subsidized by the state, in many cases through a rationing system that levels off the ability to buy. Urban apartment blocks are nationalized, rents subsidized heavily, and tenancies allocated by the authorities. A uniform system of state (or half-state and half-union) general social security is introduced, providing the population with health services free of charge.[9] Education is free also. The labor unions allocate free or extremely cheap vacation facilities. Books, phonograph records, and theater seats are subsidized heavily.

Although the initial, practical steps to fulfill the promise are taken right from the beginning through price and taxation policy, and by establishing a variety of institutions (e.g., a food distribution authority, housing offices, a social insurance center, networks of cultural and vacation centers run by firms), the complete fulfillment of the promise never occurs and never can occur [→13.7]. All through the period of classical socialism great tension builds up between the promises made in the official ideology and the system's actual economic performance. As time goes by, this failure to fulfill the initial promises becomes an oppressive burden [→18.3].

[9]In most socialist countries, health care is expanded to cover the whole population as a citizen's right at a comparatively late phase in the consolidation of the classical system. Initially, the right is acquired only by those employed in the state sector. Much the same applies to some other "basic needs" and their provision by the state.

4.4 The Self-Legitimation and Paternalistic Nature of Power

An important component of the official ideology is its views on the structure of power and the party's role in that structure.[10]

No attempt is made in the official ideology to disguise the fact that the system is dictatorial, since all political systems in existence are considered to be so. It is merely a question of who exercises dictatorship over whom. In a bourgeois society there is dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Under a socialist system dictatorship over the bourgeoisie is exercised by the proletariat. The ideology states that the working peasants and other strata in society are allied with the proletariat, whose power they support, but they are not themselves in power. So pursuit of a class policy is openly admitted by those in power.

The working class does not exercise power directly; it is represented by the party. The party is the vanguard of the working class and so ultimately of the whole of society. As such it is destined to lead society.

Should the policy of those in power be opposed by certain political groups, this does not imply a problem with the policy; it means the groups concerned are obtuse, ill-willed, or plainly inimical—spokesmen of the internal and external class enemy. But the official ideology goes even further. Neither can broad mass opposition serve as evidence for the claim that a section of the people do not support those in power. The party knows better than the people itself what the people's interest demands: this is precisely what "vanguard" means.[11] The party is an organization that has proven its capacity to head the people by leading the revolution and defeating the revolution's enemies. The ideas and methods termed "scientific socialism" in the official ideology ensure intellectual superiority to those who know and employ them over the exponents of any other ideas and methods, since it supplies them with a reli-

[10]In considering the formative strata of the official ideology there is no reason at this point to delve into the deepest, prerevolutionary layers. Marx did not cover the subject, and what few short references to postrevolutionary power he made were very general. The dictatorship of the proletariat he envisaged implies some kind of collectivist self-management, not bureaucratic power at all.

The ideas presented here (the ingredients of the official ideology of the classical system having to do with power) were developed after the assumption of power in order to account and provide subsequent ideological justification for the situation that had emerged. The development of these views is associated mainly with the efforts of Lenin and Stalin.

[11]When in 1953 the people of East Berlin rose in revolt (as the first ones to do so in Eastern Europe) and were crushed by Soviet tanks the poet Bertolt Brecht, who lived in East Germany, wrote an ironic poem saying, "The people had gambled away the confidence of the government. . . . Would it then not be simpler if the government dissolved the people and elected a new one?" B. Brecht (1967, p. 1009).

able compass for comprehending any new situation and identifying the new tasks it poses. This is what allows the party to understand the people's interests better than the millions outside the party, making it superfluous for those in power to submit themselves to the control of an electoral process involving alternative parties. In fact, to do so would be a grave mistake and a crime against the people, since the majority of votes might go to a party that ill-served the true interests of the people. To quote Stalin, "The Party cannot be a real party if it limits itself to registering what the masses of the working class feel and think, if it drags at the tail of the spontaneous movement. . . . The Party must stand at the head of the working class; it must see farther than the working class. . . ."[12]

Stalin quotes Lenin on this: "It will be necessary under the dictatorship of the proletariat to reeducate 'millions of peasants and small proprietors, and hundreds and thousands of office employees, officials, and bourgeois intellectuals,' to subordinate 'all these to the proletarian state and to proletarian leadership . . . ' just as we must ' . . . in a protracted struggle waged on the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat—reeducate the proletarians themselves, who do not abandon their petty-bourgeois prejudices at one stroke . . . but only in the course of a long and difficult mass struggle against petty-bourgeoisie influences.' "[13]

Thus power undergoes a curious process of self-legitimation. Whether the ruling group expresses the desires and interests of the majority, and whether the majority of the people supports them, are *not* measured by whether this support is manifested in some tangible form (for instance, a ballot). The possessors of power have appointed themselves as the manifest expression of the people's interests and the repository of a permanent public good. According to the elliptical thinking described, one can almost say they have legitimated their power "by definition."[14]

The classical system has a paternalistic nature self-evident from what has been said about self-legitimation: those possessed of power are convinced they know better what the interests of those whom they rule demand. The bureaucracy stands *in loco parentis*: all other strata, groups, or individuals in society are children, wards whose minds must be made up for them by their adult guardians.[15] This set-up ties in closely with

[12]See J. V. Stalin (1947, p. 82).

[13]See ibid., pp. 41–42.

[14]See the papers of F. Fehér, Á Heller, and T. H. Rigby, in T. H. Rigby and F. Fehér, eds. (1982).

[15]Condemnation of paternalistic government can already be found in Kant, as the following quotation shows: "Under such a *paternal government (imperium paternale)*, the subjects, as immature children who cannot distinguish what is truly useful or harmful to themselves, would be obliged to behave purely passively and to rely upon the judgement of the head of state as to how they *ought* to be happy, and upon his kindness at willing their happiness at all." I. Kant [1793] (1970, p. 74).

the caring role assumed by the bureaucracy and discussed in the previous section. So long as citizens do as they are told they will have not a care in the world, because the party and state will see to everything. The same stance can be seen plainly in the cult of personality that comes to surround the man at the pinnacle of power. As paramount leader he is not only the best of statesmen, generals, and scientists, he is above all the father of his people. The paternalistic role is one of the major ideological justifications for centralization and the bureaucratic organization of power.

4.5 Discipline, Willing Sacrifice, and Vigilance

An essential constituent of the official ideology is the code of moral imperatives. These are not codified formally, but they can be reconstituted from official statements, from the practice of rewarding and penalizing, and to an extent from literary and other works of art that have received the stamp of official approval.

As one would expect, a great many of the moral imperatives also apply under other systems and ideologies. The norms concerning family life, for example, are quite conservative and hardly distinguishable from the Victorian morals of Western civilization. Here it is worth being concerned exclusively with the moral norms specific to the system and relevant to the subject, political economy.

Discipline is expected of all citizens, particularly members of the party. Originality can easily be branded as affected eccentricity, independence as intractability and individualism (a pejorative word), and a critical outlook as disrespect for superiors, indiscipline, and destructiveness. None of these three attributes is prohibited, but they are all risky in practice. The characteristic certain to be appreciated is unconditional discipline. The prevailing political line must be followed, the decisions endorsed, and the commands of superiors obeyed without hesitation. This is the behavior valued and rewarded by the authorities and conducive to a successful career in the bureaucracy. The major criteria of selection are political reliability, loyalty, and fidelity to the party and its ideas (in other words, the official ideology). If these are apparent they can outweigh

I. Berlin, personifying the paternalistic dictator, phrases his line of thought like this: "easy for me to conceive myself as coercing others for their own sake, in their, not my interest. I am then claiming that I know what they truly need better than they know it themselves. . . . Once I take this view, I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture them in the name, and on behalf on their 'real' selves." I. Berlin (1969, p. 133).